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TAXATION-ESTATE TAX-RESERVATION OF POWER TO AMEND TRUST

-Settlor executed a trust indenture in 1915 whereby a trust was established for
the benefit of his three minor children. Income was to be accumulated for the
benefit of the three children until they respectively attained majority, and provision was made for the death of any child under 2 1 without surviving issue.
The settlor then reserved "the power from time to time by an instrument in
writing signed by me to amend this trust instrument so that it will more clearly
express my actual intentions if I shall consider such amendments advisable, as to
which I shall be the sole judge." 1 The commissioner determined that this
reserved power constituted a power to amend within the provisions of section
811 ( d) ( 2) of the Internal Revenue Code, 2 and that the corpus was therefore subject to the estate tax. Plaintiff, settlor's executor, paid the assessment
and sued in the district court to recover the payment. The district court held for
the United States.8 On appeal, held, reversed. Theopold v. United States,

(C.C.A. 1st, 1947) 164 F. (2d) 404.
The court held, contrary to the holding of the district court, that the dispositive clauses of the trust indenture were ambiguous, and that the reserved
power related only to trivial and unimportant changes which would not render
the corpus taxable. 4 The problems of the instant case are two-fold: ( 1) inter-

Principal case at 404.
Sec. 811: "The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by
including the value at the time of his death of all property •.. , (d) (:z.) To the extent
of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer, by trust
or otherwise, where the enjoyment thereof was subject at the date of his death to any
change through the exercise of a power, either by the decedent alone or in conjunction
with any person to alter, amend or revoke . . . ." See E.T.R., § 81.20.
8 (D.C. Mass. 1947) 69 F. Supp. 946. The court reasoned that the dispositive
clauses of the indenture were clear and unambiguous; that to construe the reserved
power as one to clarify what was- already clear would be to render it a nullity; therefore
this was a reservation of power to amend the trust to conform to the settler's subsequent
intentions and was sufficiently broad to come within the provisions of§ 811 (d) (:z.).
4 The court held that the reserved power was only a power to clarify these dispositive clauses in order to better express the settler's original intentions. This narrow
construction was warranted, the court said, by the terms of the trust indenture and
the fact that four of the five amendments clearly dealt with clarifications of the
dispositive clauses. The Fifth Amendment gave to the beneficiaries testamentary
powers of appointment; it was conceded that this latter change was more than a
1
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pretation of the instrument in order to ascertain the extent and scope of the
reserved power, and ( 2) application of section 8 I I ( d) ( 2) of the Internal
Revenue Code. In general the power to amend will not be strictly construed
so as tb permit only minor changes in the mechanics of the trust unless the text
of the indenture indicates such a construction. 5 However, the intent of the
settlor is controlling.6 The court's construction of the power as one to clarify
"what he had said in the trust instrument, not to change it to say something
else" 7 is tenable in view of the fact that the indenture redounded with ambiguities, and the actual changes made by settlor. In general the actual changes
made are a fair guide to the intent of the settlor. Thus the settlor was found
to have retained only a power to clarify his original intentions, and not to shift
the beneficial enjoyment of the property. The test of taxability is whether or not
the enjoyment of the property theretofore transferred by the decedent is subject
at the date of his death to any change through the exercise by the decedent of
the described power. 8 'I:hus the power to change beneficiaries 9 or to change
the amounts they are to take 10 renders the corpus taxable. On the other hand
if the reserved power is but a power to make minor amendments affecting only
trivial and unimportant things the property subject to the power is not taxable; 11
and furthermore it has been doubted whether Congress could constitutionally
tax the property in such case.12 It seems reasonably clear, therefore, that the
decision in the instant case is defensible; but it is questionable whether the result would have been the same if the appeal had been from the Tax Court.18
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clarification of original intention; but this was hurdled by holding that the settlor
simply erred in believing that this change expressed his original intention.
5 Welch v. Terhune, (C.C.A. 1st, 1942) 126 F. (2d) 695.
6 Brewer v. Hassett, (D.C. Mass. 1943) 49 F. Supp. 501; Theopold v. United
States, (D.C. Mass. 1947) 69 F. Supp. 946.
7 Principal case at 406.
8 Supra, note 4.
9 Bank of New York & T. Co. v. Commissioner, 20 B.T.A. 677 (1930).
10 Commissioner v. Chase Nat. Bank, (C.C.A. 2d, 1936) 82 F. (2d) 157; Holderness v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 4th, 1936) 86 F. (2d) 137.
11 Commissioner v. Hofheimer's Estate, (C.C.A. 2d, 1945) 149 F. (2d) 733.
12 Lowndes, "The Constitutionality of the Federal Estate Tax," 20 VA. L. REV.
r41, 161 (1933).
13 Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489, 64 S.Ct. 239 (1943). Paul, "Dobson v.
Commissioner: The Strange Ways of Law and Fact," 57 HARV. L. REv. 753 (1944).

